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EMPLOYMENT LAW



Is a Highly Compensated Employee with Executive Duties Entitled to or
Exempt from Overtime Pay Under the Fair Labor Standards Act Where
That Employee Is Paid at a Daily Rate?

CASE AT A GLANCE
Michael Hewitt is a highly compensated employee with executive duties who worked for
Helix Energy Solutions Group. Helix paid Hewitt at a daily rate. Employees, even highly
compensated employees with executive duties, may be entitled to overtime pay under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) where they are not paid on a salary basis. This case presents
a question of regulatory interpretation of the Department of Labor’s salary-basis test.



Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt
Docket No. 21-984
Argument Date: October 12, 2022 From: The Fifth Circuit
by Anne Marie Lofaso
West Virginia University College of Law, Morgantown, WV

Introduction

perform[]…the exempt duties…of an executive…
employee.” Since 1940, the EAP exemption’s implementing
regulations have included three conditions that must be
met: “(1) The employee must be paid a predetermined
and fixed salary that is not subject to reduction because
of variations in the quality or quantity of work performed
(the ‘salary basis test’); (2) the amount of salary paid must
meet a minimum specified amount (the ‘salary level test’);
and (3) the employee’s job duties must primarily involve
executive, administrative, or professional duties…(the
‘duties test’).” 84 Fed. Reg. 51,230 (2019).

Subject to certain exceptions that are at the heart of this
case, Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
requires employers, as a general rule, to pay employees
overtime in the amount of one and one-half times the
regular pay rate for any time worked over 40 hours a
workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Among those exempted
from the FLSA overtime-pay requirements are workers
“employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or
professional capacity.” Section 213(a)(1) (EAP exemption).
Under the FLSA, Congress has granted the secretary of
labor “broad authority to ‘defin[e] and delimi[t]’ the scope
of the [EAP] exemption.” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,
456 (1997) (quoting EAP exemption). Using that authority,
the secretary promulgated the general rule that a highly
compensated executive employee is “deemed exempt.” 29
C.F.R. § 541.601 (relevant version effective until January 1,
2020). Under the general regulation, a highly compensated
executive employee must earn “total annual compensation
of at least $100,000” and “at least $455 per week paid on
a salary…basis” and must “customarily and regularly
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

FLSA regulations are afforded Chevron deference. See
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Employers bear the burden of
proving that their employees fall within an exemption. See
Idaho Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190 (1966).
It is undisputed that Respondent Michael Hewitt is a
highly compensated employee with executive duties who
therefore meets the salary levels and duties tests of an
exempted executive employee. The question presented—
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Facts

whether Hewitt is an overtime-pay exempt employee—
turns not only on whether Helix meets the salary-basis
requirements of the general rule, Section 541.601, as
further explained in Section 541.602, but also whether
Helix meets or even needs to meet the additional
requirements set forth in the minimum-guarantee
regulation of Section 541.604 (relevant version effective
until January 1, 2020).

Petitioners Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. and its
wholly owned subsidiary Helix Well Ops, Inc. (Helix)
comprise an oil and gas services company that provides
rigless offshore well intervention services. Helix’s vessels,
which operate up to 10,000 feet below sea level, have a
project crew that focuses on the vessel’s operations. The
superintendent is the highest-ranking member of the
project crew, followed by the toolpusher, who supervises
the work of the driller, drill crew, and crane crew.
Toolpushers customarily supervise 12 to 13 employees
during a shift and must complete personnel evaluation
forms at the end of each shift. Toolpushers also oversee
and assist the driller; warrant that Helix’s programs
are executed effectively and safely; communicate daily
objectives, safety precautions, and training activities; and
ensure that the deck crew organizes the deck.

Under the salary-basis test, an employee is exempt from
overtime pay if that employee is “compensated on a
salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $455 per week.”
Section 541.200(a)(1) (regulation version effective until
Jan. 1, 2020). Further, an employee is considered “paid
on a ‘salary basis’” for purposes of the FLSA’s overtime
pay regulations if (1) that employee “regularly receives”
compensation paid “on a weekly, or less frequent basis”;
(2) that employee’s pay is a “predetermined amount
constituting all or part of the employee’s compensation”;
(3) that amount “is not subject to reduction because
of variations in the quality or quantity of the work
performed”; and (4) that employee receives the full salary
for any week worked “without regard to the number of
days or hours worked.” Section 541.602(a)(1) (older version
effective until January 1, 2020).

Between December 29, 2014, and August 1, 2017,
Respondent Michael Hewitt worked for Petitioner Helix
as a toolpusher. Helix compensated him at a daily rate,
which started at $1,341, paid biweekly. Hewitt earned
$248,053 in 2015, $218,863 in 2016, and $143,680 (over
$200,000 annualized) for the months he worked in 2017. It
is undisputed that Hewitt never earned less than $963 per
day worked but was not paid for any day he did not work.
Helix fired Hewitt for performance-related reasons.

The minimum-guarantee regulation requires that
“an exempt employee’s earnings may be computed on…a
daily…basis, without losing the exemption or violating the
salary basis requirement, if the employment arrangement
also includes a guarantee of at least the minimum weekly
required amount paid on a salary basis regardless of the
number of hours, days or shifts worked, and a reasonable
relationship exists between the guaranteed amount and the
amount actually earned.” See Section 541.604.

On August 18, 2017, Hewitt filed a class-action lawsuit
against Helix, alleging that Helix failed to pay him, and
similarly situated employees, overtime pay to which
they were entitled under the FLSA. After discovery, both
parties moved for summary judgment. Hewitt argued
that Helix misclassified him and the other toolpushers as
exempt employees. Helix argued that Hewitt and the other
toolpushers were exempt under the FLSA.

This case presents a question of regulatory interpretation
regarding which regulations apply and, if several apply,
how those regulations should be read together.

The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas (Kenneth M. Hoyt, district judge)
denied Hewitt’s motion and granted Helix’s motion for
summary judgment, holding that Hewitt was exempt from
overtime pay as a “bona fide executive, administrative,
or professional employee” under the FLSA. Section
213(a)(1). The district court found that Hewitt, a highly
compensated executive, was paid on a salary basis,
and therefore exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay
requirements. The court, in agreement with Helix, found
that Hewitt satisfied the salary-basis test because he always
received more than the regulatory minimum of $455 a
week and was paid on a biweekly basis. The court rejected

Issue

When determining whether a supervisor, compensated
over $200,000 per year, earning at least $963 per day, and
engaged in executive duties, is exempt from overtime pay
under the FLSA, does the employer only have to show
that the supervisor meets the requirements set forth
in Section 541.602 for exempting highly compensated
employees, or also the additional minimum-guarantee
salary requirements set forth in Section 541.604?

PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases
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Hewitt’s argument that he was not a salaried employee
because his pay fluctuated based on the number of days
he worked. In the court’s view, the regulation did “not
require that [Hewitt] be guaranteed to work a prescribed
number of days, but instead demand[ed] that [he] be paid
a predetermined amount, not to fall below $455 during
any week in which he works.” See Hewitt v. Helix Energy
Solutions Group, Inc., 2018 WL 6725267, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
2018) (unpublished) (citing Section 541.602(a)(1) (“Exempt
employees need not be paid for any workweek in which
they perform no work.”)

“special rule that must be satisfied before an hourly or
daily rate will be regarded as a ‘salary’” under that test.
The court concluded that the relevant special rule is the
minimum-guarantee regulation, Section 541.604, and that
“as a matter of plain text,…when it comes to daily-rate
employees like Hewitt, an employer such as Helix must
comply with Section 541.604(b).” The court interpreted
that regulation to mean that “a daily-rate worker can be
exempt from overtime—but only ‘if ’ two conditions are
met: the minimum weekly guarantee condition and the
reasonable relationship condition.”

The Fifth Circuit unanimously reversed the district court’s
decision, holding that Hewitt was not exempt under the
FLSA because he was not paid on a “salary basis.” Hewitt
v. Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., 956 F.3d 341 (5th Cir.
2020). On panel rehearing, the Fifth Circuit once again
reversed the district court, with one judge dissenting. See
Hewitt v. Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., 983 F.3d 789
(5th Cir. 2020) (vacating 956 F.3d 341). The Fifth Circuit
granted en banc review and vacated the substituted panel
decision. See Hewitt v. Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc.,
989 F.3d 418 (5th Cir. 2021).

The court found that Hewitt was not exempt from FLSA
overtime pay because the two conditions set forth in the
minimum-guarantee regulation were not met. (The court
noted that Helix “does not even purport to meet” those
two conditions.) First, the court noted that Helix paid
Hewitt a daily rate “without offering a minimum weekly
required amount paid ‘regardless of the number of hours,
days or shifts worked,’” as required by Section 541.604(b).
In so finding, the court rejected Helix’s argument that the
“daily rate is the minimum weekly guaranteed amount.”
Second, the court found that Helix did not comply with
the second prong, the reasonable-relationship test, because
it undisputedly paid Hewitt “orders of magnitude greater
than the minimum weekly guaranteed amount.”

In a divided decision (12–6), the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed the district court’s decision that Hewitt
was an exempt employee and remanded the case to the
district court for further consideration. See Hewitt v.
Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., 15 F.4th 289 (5th Cir.
2021) (en banc). Neither party disputed that Hewitt was
a highly compensated executive employee whose pay
was computed on a daily basis. Accordingly, the court
focused its analysis on whether Helix complied with the
general salary-basis (29 C.F.R. § 541.602) and minimumrequirements (29 C.F.R. § 541.604) regulations. The court
explained that employers like Helix who compensate
certain workers, such as Hewitt, at an “hourly or daily
rate” must satisfy both Section 541.602(a)’s “general”
salary-basis rule and Section 541.604(b)’s “special rule” for
employees. The court concluded that Helix failed to satisfy
either.

The court also rejected Helix’s main contentions in
response—“it is not required to comply with Section
541.604(b) because Hewitt is a ‘highly compensated
employee’” under Section 541.601, or because it
complies with Section 541.602. The problem with Helix’s
Section 541.604(b) argument, the court explained, is
that the regulation’s plain language expressly requires an
employer to satisfy the salary-basis test, which Helix failed
to do. Helix’s Section 541.602 argument also fails, in the
court’s view, because an employer must satisfy all relevant
regulations, not just some. Finally, the court rejected
Helix’s purpose analysis, explaining that nothing in the
text suggested that employers may withhold overtime pay
just because an employee is highly compensated and, in
any event, purpose cannot trump plain text. Rounding
out its analysis, the court concluded that out-of-court
precedent either supported or at least did not conflict with
its conclusion.

Reviewing the general salary-basis rule at the outset, the
court emphasized that “an employee will be considered
to be paid on a ‘salary basis’…if the employee regularly
receives each pay period on a weekly, or less frequent basis,
a predetermined amount constituting all or part of the
employee’s compensation” (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a)
(emphasis added by the court)). Because Hewitt’s pay
was calculated at a daily rate, not on a weekly or monthly
or yearly basis, the court turned its attention to the
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

The decision contained a concurring opinion and two
dissents. Judge Ho, concurring, wrote separately to address
the amici’s atextual arguments, most of which the dissent
adopted. Judge Jones, dissenting and joined by Judges
Owen, Weiner, Elrod, and Southwick, would have held
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that Hewitt was exempt under Section 541.601 as a highly
compensated employee who met the salary-basis test
embodied in Section 541.602, and therefore that Helix did
not have to meet the additional requirements set forth
in the minimum-guarantee regulation, Section 541.604.
In the dissent’s view, it was not ignoring Section 541.604.
Rather, it was simply not relevant to the circumstances of
this case because “the whole point of Section 541.604 is to
make clear that those employees, when not covered by the
[highly compensated employee] exemption, can be paid
a minimum guarantee plus extras without losing their…
exempt status.” The dissent thereby concluded that a plain
text reading of the relevant regulations, Sections 541.601
and 541.602, answers the question without reference
to Section 541.604. The dissent further explained that
out-of-court precedent supported its, not the majority’s,
conclusion, as did the regulatory structure and history.
Finally, the dissent explained that the majority’s reading of
the regulations was at odds with a reasonable construction
of the FLSA. In a separate dissenting opinion, Judge
Weiner, joined by Judges Owen, Jones, Dennis, and Elrod,
wrote to discuss the extent to which the majority opinion
defies the commonsense conception that overtime pay is
limited to lower-paid and blue-collar workers.

“core policy goals” of simplifying the “test for white-collar
supervisors whose compensation is substantial enough to
dispel any reasonable doubt about whether their whitecollar roles are ‘bona fide.’” Helix next argues that the
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the regulations conflicts
with the FLSA’s statutory language, which exempts from
its overtime requirements any employee working in a
“bona fide executive…capacity.” Section 213(a)(1). Helix
ends with a policy analysis that the Fifth Circuit’s reading
of the regulations would undermine a long-standing
personnel practice of the resource exploration and
extraction industry.
Respondent Hewitt asserts that where an employer pays
an employee on a daily basis, it cannot claim that such
employee is exempt because it fails to satisfy the salarybasis test. As a threshold matter, Hewitt contends that
Helix cannot satisfy Section 541.602(a) because it paid
Hewitt with—not without—regard for the number of
days worked. To support this argument, Hewitt adds
that his compensation was not “predetermined” for any
week as required by the regulation. Moreover, Helix’s
interpretation is inconsistent with the Department
of Labor’s long-standing interpretation of Section
541.602, which is supported by the final rule’s preamble.
According to Hewitt, Section 541.604(b) are not additional
requirements of Section 541.602, as Helix contends. Rather
Section 541.604(b) clarifies Section 541.602 by explaining
how an employer can meet the salary-basis test for
employees paid on a daily basis.

The Supreme Court thereafter granted Helix’s petition for
certiorari on the meaning and application of the 29 C.F.R.
§§ 541.601 and 541.604.

Case Analysis

This case will decide whether highly compensated
employees paid on a daily basis are exempt from overtime
pay. Petitioner Helix asserts that highly compensated
executive employees are exempt under the FLSA’s
plain language, Section 213(a)(1), which exempts those
“employed in a bona fide executive … capacity,” as
implemented by the general regulation. Under Section
541.601, which interprets Section 213, an employee is
“deemed exempt” if that employee earns at least $100,000
in “total annual compensation,” earns at least $455 per
week, is paid on a salary basis, and performs “one or
more of the exempt duties…of an executive…employee.”
Section 541.601. Helix further argues that Section 541.604’s
requirements are not met here for three reasons. First,
Section 541.601 does not cross-reference Section 541.604,
even though it cross-references other regulations. Second,
applying Section 541.604 in these circumstances would
create inconsistencies in the regulatory scheme. Third,
such an interpretation would undermine the regulation’s
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

Several amici filed briefs supporting both petitioner and
respondent. Most significantly, the solicitor general filed a
brief in support of Hewitt.

Significance

This case could be significant for at least three reasons.
First, as a matter of wage-hour law, this decision will
clarify how the salary-basis test is to be applied to highly
compensated supervisors. Potentially, this could affect
many workers beyond the resource exploration and
extraction industry. Depending on how the Court rules
and how employers have been structuring compensation
packages for their highly compensated workers, this
decision could have long arms.
Second, this case will give us further insight into the
Court’s textualist philosophy. Both parties claim that
the plain language supports their answer to the question
presented. Cases with dueling textualist claims, such
as this, often give us insight into how each justice
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incorporates context, legislative structure, legislative
history, and policy into their textual analysis. Perhaps
the most interesting aspect of this interplay is how the
justices will view the FLSA’s manifold purposes. Helix’s
view is that those purposes are narrow and mostly limited
to preventing employers from exploiting blue-collar
workers. However, there is ample support for at least two
additional purposes of the FLSA. The first is “to spread
employment…by incentivizing employers to hire more
employees rather than requiring existing employees
to work longer hours.” Defining and Delimiting the
Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional,
Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,391,
32,394 (May 23, 2016). The second “is to reduce over-work
and its detrimental effect on the health and well-being of
workers.” Although these purposes are not inherently at
odds—after all, high-paid workers can also be exploited—
it does show how emphasizing one purpose over another
can influence how the justices view the text.

the statute forecloses such an interpretation. In that case,
it would be up to Congress whether to amend the FLSA.
More important, given the longevity of these regulations,
foreclosing such an interpretation is likely to mean that
the Court has narrowed its theory of administrative
deference. It is for this reason that this case is potentially
exceptionally significant.
Anne Marie Lofaso is the Arthur B. Hodges Professor
of Law at the West Virginia University College of Law
in Morgantown, West Virginia. She can be reached at
304.293.7356 or anne.lofaso@mail.wvu.edu.
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ATTORNEYS FOR THE PARTIES
For Petitioners Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. and
Helix Well Ops, Inc. (Paul D. Clement, 202.742.8900)
For Respondent Michael J. Hewitt (Samuel Charles
Kaplan, 703.371.5139)

Third, this case also provides the Court with a vehicle
for re-evaluating its Chevron doctrine. Several justices
have not been shy about overturning precedent,
which they believe to have been wrongly decided.
Administrative deference doctrines, such as Chevron,
have met with greater judicial hostility recently, signaling
a possible constriction or even reversal of precedent.
See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (“I write separately to note that [the
EPA’s] request for deference [in its interpretation of
the Clean Air Act] raises serious questions about the
constitutionality of our broader practice of deferring
to agency interpretations of federal statutes) (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.); see also West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022)
(limiting the EPA’s authority to interpret the Clean Air
Act to circumstances must where it can point to clear
congressional authorization in the statute).

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioners Helix Energy Solutions Group,
Inc. and Helix Well Ops, Inc.
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America
(Pratik Arvind Shah, 202.887.4210)
Independent Petroleum Association of America and
Offshore Operators Committee (Robert P. Lombardi,
504.524.4162)
Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Montana, Utah, and
West Virginia (Scott Grant Stewart, 601.359.5563)
Texas Oil and Gas Association, Inc. and the
American Petroleum Institute (David Bryce Jordan,
713.951.9400)
In Support of Respondent Michael J. Hewitt
American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (Matthew James Ginsburg,
202.637.5397)

Depending on how the Court decides to rule, the
administrative law aspects of this case could have a
greater legal impact than the wage-hour aspects of this
case. If the Court rules against Helix, that decision will be
costly, but the industry and other industries could simply
amend their personnel practices. Similarly, if the Court
rules in favor of Helix, the Biden administration could
simply clarify the regulation to supersede the Court’s
interpretation—unless, however, the Court decides that

PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

Massachusetts Nurses Association (Nicholas D.
Wanger, 508.485.6600)
National Nurses United (John R. Mooney,
202.783.0010)
United States (Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General,
202.514.2217)
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